Dr WAYNE MAPP (National—North Shore) : Members and the public would think that a bill entitled the Counter-Terrorism Bill would be an accurate description of its purpose. Indeed, in part it is. National is supporting this bill, and its implementation of the conventions on plastic explosives—chemical tracing thereof, Semtex—and also the nuclear proliferation issue. Those are perfectly laudable things to do, and one would expect them to be in a bill about counter-terrorism. The question I have for the Minister, and I would like him to rise to speak to this because it is an issue that was dealt with at length by the—

The CHAIRPERSON (Ann Hartley): Can I remind the member that we are dealing with the title. It is a very narrow debate, and the member must stick to the title.

Dr WAYNE MAPP: Madam Chairperson, if you had not interrupted me you would have perceived precisely the point I am about to make. One would think that a bill entitled the Counter-Terrorism Bill would be confined to that.

The Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee raised the issue with the Minister as to why this bill had some much wider provisions relating to the Crimes Act and the Misuse of Drugs Act. Those provisions may be desirable in their own right and, indeed, as the Minister has said in the past, some of them are related to counter-terrorism—the need for tracking devices, and things of that nature. The concern, however, is this. The title should be accurate. It should direct members of Parliament, and especially members of the public, to the purpose of the bill—what it is actually about—and it does not.

Certainly part of the bill is about counter-terrorism, but part of it is about general amendments to the criminal law. Submissions were made by the Law Society, in particular, and by various specialists, who presented to the select committee. Members in the Chamber who were at the select committee will know what I am talking about when I say that the broader issues had to be drawn to their attention. They received, at best, cursory attention, except when they had to put in supplementary submissions. That is simply not good enough. The Minister should take on board the injunction from the select committee.

I would like the Minister to speak on this point, to assure the Committee that this kind of practice will not continue—that bills will be more accurately described—and that a bill that has general propositions about the criminal law, as desirable as they might be, is not nevertheless described only as the Counter-Terrorism Bill. Why, for instance, did we not get a title that said something like “Counter-Terrorism and Amendments to the Crimes Act Bill”? That would have been a more accurate description.

Members may ask why I have not put in a Supplementary Order Paper to that effect. Well, frankly, it would be pointless. The time for that is at the introduction of the bill, not at this stage of the process. I am not going to put in an amendment. It would be too late. This is about directing the information to the public and to members at the time of the bill’s introduction, not about what we do in the Committee of the whole House, and not about what the Minister’s Supplementary Order Paper does, which is to divide the bill into separate components. That is all necessary and desirable, but it does not address this central concern.

I am concentrating on this issue because I think an important point of parliamentary procedure is that it is the Government’s duty to properly inform the public what bills are about. National does support the measures. We broadly support not just the counter-terrorism measures, but also amendments to the Crimes Act and the Misuse of Drugs Act. What we are concerned about, however, is this creeping habit—one born of arrogance—that says the Government does not have to inform the public and can do just what it likes.

KEITH LOCKE (Green) : My speech will probably help the previous speaker, Wayne Mapp. He said that he did not move an amendment to the title, but I have moved an amendment to the title, which I think he will vote for because it does accommodate his concern. The amendment is to delete the words “Counter-Terrorism” in the title and replace them with the words “Crimes Amendment and Counter-Terrorism”. It is then clear to anyone reading the bill that it concerns both issues. As Wayne Mapp pointed out, there are not only amendments to the Terrorism Suppression Act—that is, amendments relating to terrorism or counter-terrorism—but there are also amendments to the Crimes Act, the Summary Proceedings Act, and the Misuse of Drugs Act. I hope that the title I have proposed will meet with the approval of the Committee, because it is more appropriate. As indicated in the second reading speeches by Wayne Mapp and also by Peter Dunne, there was concern in the select committee that the bill tried to incorporate two quite different things—namely, an amendment to our criminal legislation and amendments to the Terrorism Suppression Act.

Unfortunately, I was not able to get the committee to agree to split the bill into two. There was a clear interest to split it into two, and have one bill dealing specifically with amendments to the Terrorism Suppression Act, and the other bill dealing with amendments to the other three criminal Acts that I referred to. It would have been important for the whole process of discussion, because I do not think we got quite the number of submitters, particularly on amendments to the criminal legislation, that we might have had if the bill had been correctly titled. People may not have realised that there were so many general amendments to criminal legislation under a bill called the Counter-Terrorism Bill.

An additional problem is that when general amendments are incorporated into the criminal law, under the Counter-Terrorism Bill, people are scared off a bit from critically examining them. One of the phenomena today, in the post - September 11 environment, is that people are scared of being seen as soft on terrorism. They are a bit more scared to look at any changes that come forward under that title, for fear that they will be deemed to be soft on terrorism. The case of Ahmed Zaoui that is going on in New Zealand right now is an illustration of why an amendment should have been made to the title at the beginning, as Wayne Mapp indicated.

It is true that for a long time people were scared to look closely at the Ahmed Zaoui case and discuss it in the public arena because they might get linked up with that guy, he might turn out to be a terrorist, and then they would be labelled as supporting terrorists. It was only in the months after he was imprisoned last December, and as the debate has proceeded, that people have been a bit more confident in coming out into the open and saying perhaps it was wrong that the security risk certificate procedure could override and cancel the refugee status determination proceedings at the level of the refugee status branch. The Refugee Status Appeals Authority can be overridden by the secret procedure of the Minister of Immigration in her putting down the security risk certificate on Ahmed Zaoui, and then the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, operating in secret and not even giving Mr Zaoui or his lawyers any information on what the accusations are against him, can determine his future and perhaps send him back to torture, and possible death, under the Algerian regime that he fled from many years ago.

I think that is an indication of the problem of putting things under a title like “Counter-Terrorism” We also see that in the United States. Generally, its criminal law has a lot of checks and balances and a Bill of Rights to back it up, but one can look at Guantanamo Bay and at the abuse of due process and civil liberties in that area, under the guise of counter-terrorism. About 650 people are sitting in Guantanamo Bay, and a lot of them have been there for a couple of years. They could be there indefinitely. I think it was US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld who said that they might be there until the war against terrorism is over.

RICHARD WORTH (National—Epsom) : It is not often that speeches on the title can be evocative and romantic. Certainly, in the course of these short comments it is not my plan to meet that high threshold standard. However, I would like to make several points to a crowded Chamber and a large number of alert listeners. Those comments do centre on the title, the “Counter-Terrorism Bill”. I am very much aware that there has been already before the House a Terrorism Suppression Bill, which has passed through its stages. There is always a niggle at the back of the minds of those who serve in the intelligence community, centring on the words “counter-terrorism”. Certainly, in the context of objectives to be achieved, terrorism suppression—albeit that that name has already been taken—is a much happier phrase. I see Government members nodding in acquiescence to that view, and so they should.

In looking at the name of the bill—the “Counter-Terrorism Bill”—the starting point, I suggest, is to explore briefly what a terrorist act is. Although that is not defined in this particular bill, it certainly was in the Terrorism Suppression Act. That Act had associated with it three conjoint elements in the test. As members will recall, the first element of the test was that the act was carried out to advance an ideological, a political, or a religious cause. The second element of the test was that the act was intended to induce civilian terror, or perhaps to unduly compel a Government or an international organisation to do, or not do, something. The third element was that the act was intended to cause one of a number of outcomes. Without going through that material, those outcomes included destruction of or damage to property, and the introduction or release of disease-bearing organisms.

Whilst I have no quibble with the word “terrorism” in the title of this bill, it is the word “counter” that I may perhaps take exception to. When I say I may take exception to that, I need to qualify that. As we know, this bill, in terms of its title, will have a short future life. That is because the bill will be divided in a dramatic way into six separate bills. It will lose its present title upon that event occurring if Supplementary Order Paper 163 is passed. Supplementary Order Paper 163 proposes that the bill be split into six wholly separate pathways. Those pathways would see this legislation variously called the Crimes Amendment Act, the Terrorism Suppression Amendment Act, the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Act, the Sentencing Amendment Act, and the Summary Proceedings Amendment Act. So although there are good motives behind the previous speaker’s comments, which were intended to convey a more correct appellation in terms of the title to the bill, it is too late for such comments. He sought to embark upon a pointless exercise, because the Counter-Terrorism Bill of tonight will shortly be renamed in the ways that I have described.

The previous speaker made—and, of course, Dr Mapp, in his usual fluent style, similarly made—the point that some philosophical issues relating to the title are well discussed, I would assert, in the commentary on the bill as reported from the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. Under the heading “Approach to new provisions in the bill” a philosophical argument is raised, based on views expressed by Professor Matthew Palmer, whom I hold in the highest regard, that terrorist acts are no different in many cases from normal crimes such as murder or bombing, except for the political, ideological, or religious motive behind the terrorist acts. So there is a policy argument that needs to be well addressed here.

DAIL JONES (NZ First) : I take the point made by the preceding speaker that we are looking at a bill that will shortly be split into the Terrorism Suppression Amendment Act, the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Act, and the Summary Proceedings Amendment Act. As far as the title is concerned, a wide range of titles is possible and certainly will happen. A suggestion was put forward by the Greens member that the bill should be called the “Crimes Amendment and Counter-Terrorism Bill”. New Zealand First supports this legislation. We are strongly in favour of all action to support law and order and to take action against terrorist activities, including those with ideological, political, or religious causes, and we support the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service aspect of the legislation.

One sometimes wonders where the Greens are coming from in this Parliament. Here they are, opposing the Labour Government. Legislation has been passed that has gone though the House purely because of Green support—I think of the Supreme Court Bill, in particular—but they are raising objections to this bill. If the Greens were sincere about being an Opposition party, they should have opposed the Supreme Court Bill as well as this bill, rather than keeping the Government and its policies in place. But they just want to allow the Government to run for the 2 or so years that it has to go—unless Miss Helen Clark waves the white flag earlier than usual—and to collect whatever is coming to them in the meantime. The Greens have no regard for the proper constitutional way of doing things, which makes things difficult for the Labour Government. Instead, they supported the Labour Government on the Supreme Court Bill and then opposed it on the genetic modification legislation. The only consistency about the Greens is that they will do everything possible to keep the Government in office, even though that means that their views on the genetic modification legislation are ignored, defeated, and destroyed by the Government.

I now get back to Mr Locke’s view that this bill should be called the “Crimes Amendment and Counter-Terrorism Bill”. His may be the only opposing view to be expressed in the Committee. The time to have really dug his toes in and to have tried to get some support for his measure was before the Supreme Court Bill was passed. He should have told the Government what to do with that type of legislation, because the appeal rights and suchlike of the Counter-Terrorism Bill—which is about be divided into a number of different bills—that people may wish to have enforced would have been better considered by an independent body such as the Privy Council, rather than by the bodies that currently exist in New Zealand.

When Mr Locke opposes the bill, he also supports Mr Zaoui. We know that Mr Zaoui has been banned from a couple, at least, of European countries because he is a terrorist. Why on earth should anyone in New Zealand want that person to be retained here? Mr Zaoui had the opportunity to go through 17 different countries in the world, all of which have rejected him, and here we have the Greens wanting to support him. That is quite an extraordinary state of affairs. Mr Zaoui is a person who got on a plane to come to New Zealand, destroyed his passport on the way here, and then expected us to throw out the welcome mat for him. It is an extraordinary state of affairs. The Greens talk about wanting to protect our country and our environment from germs and suchlike, but they seem to have no hesitation in allowing any type of person to come into this country and create any type of terrorist havoc. There is a great inconsistency in the way that the Greens—and Mr Locke, in particular—look at these measures.

The New Zealand First Party will support this bill, as it always does with regard to legislation that implements good law and order and that will ensure that ideological, political, and religious causes are not supported by terrorist activities. We look forward to supporting the bills into which the Counter-Terrorism Bill will be divided, pursuant to Supplementary Order Paper 163.

KEITH LOCKE (Green) : I would like to follow up some of the points made by the previous speaker about the title of the Counter-Terrorism Bill, and whether “counter-terrorism” is an appropriate term. I took a very moderate approach in my first speech. I wanted to address the main issue of two different types of bill being incorporated into one, with disadvantages for the public and for Parliament. The question posed is also whether this bill will really put counter-terrorism into effect—that is, really opposing and reducing the incidence of terrorism throughout the world, and particularly in the Islamic world, which has most of the instances of terrorism at the present time.

One of the criticisms that have been made, including by submitters on this bill and on its predecessor, the Terrorism Suppression Bill, is that the definition of terrorism in the Terrorism Suppression Act is much too broad. It does not target only people who support those who use violence against and create terror amongst civilians; it also covers, within the very broad definition of terrorism in that Act, people who seriously disrupt an infrastructure facility in a way likely to endanger human life. One does not even need to intend to endanger human life to be covered under that definition. All that one needs to do is to fulfil two other criteria: first, to unduly compel a Government to do something—which many politicians are accused of—and, second, the motive has to be political, religious, or ideological. Richard Worth made a point about the singling out of politically motivated acts, and referred back to Matthew Palmer’s comments on that very question.

I find that rather strange, because sometimes a political motivation can lead to terror and very bad things that we all want to condemn. We have incidents in our own history, such as the 1981 Springbok tour, when people protested—including many members in this Chamber at the present time—and got involved in quite disruptive activity that could possibly be covered under this bill. The fact that they were doing it for a political reason—that is, they were against racial injustice and South African apartheid—was used in court in their favour. That is the reality. Other people do things for a religious reason in a positive, humanitarian way, in terms of non-violent civil disobedience. But if, in relation to real terrorism, we really want to have justice, we have to go back to treating all actions, in terms of this legislation, as being fundamentally the same if they have an intimidatory effect on a civilian population and cause real violence and death to people. The motivation is not what counts; it is the nature of the act and whether it is against what is, in effect, our criminal legislation. So do we need to have this layer of anti-terrorist offences on top of our criminal legislation?

Another amendment to the title that I could have put forward might have been the “Counter-Terrorism (Except State Terrorism) Bill”, because this bill and the preceding Terrorism Suppression Act target a particular form—killing, wounding, or inspiring fear in civilians—of terrorism: terror caused by non-State agents. We can see an example of that when we look at the recent terrorism in Indonesia. Everyone is very conscious of the horrific terrorist bombing in Bali that was commemorated recently. Everyone is very conscious of that terrorism and, rightly, very opposed to that. They welcome the fact that the perpetrators have been brought to justice and punished. We all agree on that. But within Indonesia there is another form of terrorism that kills, wounds, and maims many more people than in the Bali bombing did. That is not to excuse the Bali bombing, but to point out that in Aceh today the Indonesian Government, through its military, is terrorising the people of Aceh, killing many of them, and pushing many of them out of their homes and the places they live in. That form of terrorism is killing more people than the Bali bombing did. Terrorism cannot be balanced on a scale. We cannot say that the Bali terrorism is any better or any worse than that in Aceh, but in terms of the number of people killed, more have been killed in Aceh.

MARK PECK (Labour—Invercargill) : I move, That the question be now put.

Hon KEN SHIRLEY (Deputy Leader—ACT) : The ACT party will be supporting the Counter-Terrorism Bill and its various derivatives. The debate on the appropriateness of the title is very interesting. It has gone along the path of whether it is the nature of the act or the motive of the perpetrator that defines something as terrorism, and that is a legitimate debate.

ACT certainly upholds the rights and freedoms of individuals, and in many respects would probably have views that are not too dissimilar to those of the Greens.

We also acknowledge the role of the State, and the powers of the State that are necessary to uphold those rights and freedoms. But that is where we can come to a dilemma: the powers of the State can reach a point where, in purporting to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals, they actually erode them. As legislators, I think we should always be very mindful of that fact when we give powers to the State, because there are some quite awesome powers that legislators give to various States, and some States do abuse those powers—that is reality.

But like it or not, the world has changed. We are in a war against terror, there are unforeseen consequences, and we need to play our part in it. It is important, though, that we do not get carried away with the rhetoric and the emotion of the time and overplay our hands. But there is no doubt in my mind—and certainly ACT’s position is quite clear: we support appropriate measures to give powers to our Government, in cooperation with other likeminded Governments, to combat what has become international terror, perpetrated on a planned, international scale. The scale on which that terror is now being enacted is something we have not seen before.

We note the various components the bill is being split into: the Crimes Amendment Bill, the Terrorism Suppression Amendment Bill, the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Bill, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill, the Sentencing Amendment Bill, and also the Summary Proceedings Amendment Bill. Each one of those is a sensible component, and we understand and support the reason for it being separated at this stage. However, I still have considerable reservations—and I suspect that the Minister in the chair does also—about the breadth and direction of these powers. I guess my plea to the Minister—and the ACT message to him—is to always remember the rightful role of the rights and freedoms of individuals and civil liberties. There is a point where excessive powers in the hands of the State will begin to trample on the rights and freedoms of individuals. That said, the ACT party supports this bill—not in its entirety, as my colleague has pointed out, but the overall direction of it.

Various comments have been made about the plight of Ahmed Zaoui with regard to this issue. On that issue, I do not have sufficient information, and I am not sure that anyone has. I think it is very dangerous for members of Parliament to leap to conclusions without adequate information. We are being denied access to that information, which is regrettable, so it comes back to having faith that the powers that be are exercising those powers judiciously and appropriately, although we can never be sure of that. But at face value, I am certainly not convinced that Mr Zaoui is a terrorist, as some would purport. The very fact that he is fleeing from a corrupt regime speaks volumes in itself. A very corrupt regime in Algeria has put him on the top of its wanted list, which I think is a useful example of the propensity for emotion to overrun logic and common sense.

GEORGINA BEYER (Labour—Wairarapa) : I move, That the question be now put.

Hon KEN SHIRLEY (Deputy Leader—ACT) : I raise a point of order, Madam Chairperson. United Future members—and I know they are only new—have been attempting to get the call, and they have not had an opportunity to contribute to the debate.

The CHAIRPERSON (Ann Hartley): The question has been accepted. The Clerk will conduct a party vote.

Hon KEN SHIRLEY: I do ask that you reflect upon the reasonableness of your decision, though, because the United Future party has not had an opportunity to contribute.

RICHARD WORTH (National—Epsom) : Clause 2 is the commencement provision of the Counter-Terrorism Bill, and National supports this bill and its enactment in the divided way that Supplementary Order Paper 163 proposes. But I would like to draw the attention of the Committee to what seems to be a clear anomaly in respect of clause 2, and to invite the Minister, who has a very detailed knowledge of this bill and all its intricacies, to make some short and relevant comment on what I now say.

There is no doubt that in the select committee process, which saw the bill looked at by the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee and reported on by it, it was seen as appropriate to significantly change clause 2. Subclauses (1) and (2) of the bill as introduced—which provided that clauses 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23 of the principal Act and clause 13B of the Terrorism Suppression Act were to come into force on a date to be appointed by the Governor-General by Order in Council—were struck out. I ask the Minister why it was seen as appropriate to make the significant changes that the committee did, and why it is that the Minister supports, and the Government presumably supports, the changes that have been made. The select committee has now proposed that clauses 3 to 34 and the schedule come into force on a date to be appointed by the Governor-General, but there is also a note that one or more Orders in Council may appoint different dates for different provisions, and also a second provision that deals with other possibilities.

So if one looks at clauses 3 to 34 in the context of this bill, it is to be seen that they certainly spread across a large number of parts. For example, they are spread across Part 1, where amendments to the Crimes Actare numbered in clauses 3 to 8. Then in Part 2 we see a similar spread, with amendments being made to the Terrorism Suppression Act. In Part 3 there is a similar spread, with amendments being made to the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act, the Sentencing Act, and, finally, parts of the Summary Proceedings Act, before we come to clause 34, which inserts a raft of provisions relating to the important subject of tracking devices. I would like to ask the Minister why it has been seen as appropriate to have this significant change made in the bill.

KEITH LOCKE (Green) : I think the points Richard Worth has raised about the commencement date are important—that it is really left to Orders in Council and that we do not quite know what will go on. When it gets to the question of Orders in Council I hope that wisdom will prevail, because we do not want to rush into the commencement of the provisions in this bill. That is particularly important in this climate at the present time, when people—even members of Parliament—are getting so stirred up about terrorism in a way that it is affecting their rationality and ability to discuss questions of terrorism, or of who might or might not be a terrorist, in a rational way. So the longer the commencement date is extended the better, and I would prefer to have it in this commencement clause that none of the provisions will take effect for 5 years. That would give a proper cooling-down period—not only in New Zealand but around the world. We could take stock a little of some of the infringements of civil liberties in the name of the fight against terrorism—as we see in the matter of Guantanamo Bay, which I mentioned before—and there could be time for people to settle down and look at this whole issue in a calm way.

We have seen today an illustration of why the commencement date should be extended. People have been going on about Ahmed Zaoui, both in this debate and in question time, and trying to treat him and describe him as a terrorist when the good people on the Refugee Status Appeals Authority, who spent months on the matter, delivered a 223-page judgment that completely cleared him of all charges of terrorism. But there is an attitude out there, and amongst some people in the House, that those very skilled people in that area should not be taken account of, and that we should just say he is a terrorist. Another example of why the commencement date should be extended is that when one reads the newspapers one sees an example of the Ahmed Zaoui case again. When he was sent to Paremoremo prison in December last year, if one reads the papers of that time, there was almost an assumption that he was a terrorist. He had been called a terrorist, so there was an assumption he was a terrorist. That is the climate we are acting in at the present time, so we should not have an early commencement date.

The police themselves got all carried away in that matter—and they are supposed to be the enforcers of our law. They looked up a website of a chap called Lyndon LaRouche, an extreme right-wing nutter who has run for US President, is a conspiracy theorist, and all the rest of it. The New Zealand Police tapped in their computers and in their security risk certificate for Ahmed Zaoui on 11 December last year, they told people to look at that LaRouche site to find out that Ahmed Zaoui was a terrorist. Of course, Lyndon LaRouche was just regurgitating the propaganda of the Algerian regime—a murderous regime that had sentenced him to death in absentia.

Jim Peters: What about the French court?

KEITH LOCKE: That is a good call from Jim Peters, on my right. The French court is an interesting case. In the year 2000, I think it was—

Richard Worth: 2001.

KEITH LOCKE: In 2001 French court officials said they would have a go at Ahmed Zaoui for something that he and a few other people were supposed to have done in 1993. They tried to make out that he was involved in some terrorist conspiracy. Did they notify Ahmed Zaoui—who was readily obtainable—that he was being brought before a French court 7 or 8 years after that alleged event? No, they did not inform him. Did they give him any chance to defend himself? No. What was the nature of the charges? They were gone through by the Refugee Status Appeals Authority in great detail, and found to be completely wanting. That was the reality. When in the French court they did convict him, did they say they would extradite the guy to go back to France? No, they said they would give him a suspended sentence—hardly what they would do for a real terrorist.

It was not a process of justice, and the Refugee Status Appeals Authority got all the evidence together, talked to all the people who knew something about the situation, and decided that it was a completely phoney process of justice. I think it is an illustration of my point.

The CHAIRPERSON (Ann Hartley): I remind members again that this is a debate on the commencement clause.

Dr WAYNE MAPP (National—North Shore) : The Chairperson is right; this debate is on the commencement clause. I am not sure, from the previous speech, what Mr Ahmed Zaoui had to do with this, but I do want to speak very briefly about his case, because as a number of members will know—certainly, Mr Locke—I have had a little to say about it over the last few weeks. It is important that some of the facts come out—facts that are on the public record.

Ahmed Zaoui was convicted in Belgium after a 5-day hearing—a bit like a District Court or High Court hearing in New Zealand—of having associations with the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). He was then sentenced and deported. He went to Switzerland and was deported from there. He was convicted in absentia in France. Well, perhaps, that is a questionable procedure, but the key point is that he was convicted after a full hearing in Belgium. Yet the Refugee Status Appeals Authority felt that it could sit in New Zealand and adopt some kind of appeal court process for Belgian proceedings. In the absence of any evidence out of Belgium, was the prosecution evidence from Belgium presented in New Zealand? The answer is no, because there was no evidence from the prosecution in Belgium. We effectively had the Refugee Status Appeals Authority acting, in practical terms, only on information from the defence. I guess that if one hears only from the defence, one may well believe them.

But there is a more serious issue here, and all the defenders of Mr Ahmed Zaoui neglect it entirely. In New Zealand we have a two-stage process. The first is the issue of the national security risk certificate. It is worth bearing in mind that Mr Zaoui is not a resident, or a citizen, but a person who entered New Zealand illegally, and we are entitled in this country to ask whether people who enter our country constitute a national security risk. After the certificate is issued we go further. We then have a special procedure that is dealt with by an independent person, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. That person is not a bureaucrat, I might add, but a highly respected, retired High Court judge, whose job it is to assess independently the issuance of that certificate. I am on the record, as are others, as saying the decision of that person, Justice Greig, should be the determinant of the case, and that he should be able to be left alone to get on with his job. He is appointed for that very purpose.

One would think, on hearing from Mr Locke, that Mr Zaoui’s lawyers cannot make submissions to the Inspector-General, but they can. Further, we heard in the Chamber today that there is a synopsis of what has occurred against Mr Zaoui. So I think it is important that we stick to the facts, but recognise that in the case of Mr Zaoui we let the proper processes take place and he gets an independent assessment from the Inspector-General.

It is wrong for those who support him—Mr Locke and Mr Robson—to pretend that we do not have fair processes. We do.

This country has spent hundreds of thousands of dollars—through legal aid, through a lengthy hearing in the Refugee Status Appeals Authority, and now, before the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security—taking Mr Zaoui’s interests into account. But, more important, given that he is not a resident or citizen, we should be taking the interests of this nation into account. This is not the time to look at these issues through rose-coloured glasses. We have to take a realistic approach. I trust retired High Court Judge Greig to do the right thing, and Mr Locke should do likewise. That decision should be determinative. I do not expect Mr Locke to say, should the decision be adverse to Mr Zaoui, that we should then continue to defend him. The question here is whether we trust our institutions to protect public safety.

RON MARK (NZ First) : Let me start by saying that we are discussing—

The CHAIRPERSON (Ann Hartley): We are talking about the commencement date.

RON MARK: Yes, that is what I thought. We were talking about clause 2, “Commencement”, but with Mr Locke having opened up with such a tirade, he has expanded the debate under the normal conventions, allowing people such as Mr Mapp to respond. I simply want to make one comment on the Zaoui case—the case that Mr Locke outlined in his argument against the commencement date. From where New Zealand First stands, Mr Zaoui would not be causing any discussion, any debate, or any conjecture as to whether he is a terrorist, had he been dealt with as the illegal entrant into this country that he is—end of story.

Mr Zaoui came here with some documents, trashed them, presented himself without documentation, and claimed political asylum and refugee status. Mr Zaoui should have been put on the first aircraft back to the country from whence he came, and we would not be wasting time and taxpayer dollars debating the merits of his perceived case. That is precisely where I stand on that issue. I cannot for the life of me understand how Mr Locke can go out there and talk to people about how they do not get adequate funding to pay for free health-care for children under 6—they are all having to shell out of their pockets now—while, at the same time, Mr Zaoui is consuming hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of legal aid, of SIS time, of court time, and of jail time, all courtesy of the taxpayer.

It is interesting looking at the commencement date, and I would like the Minister, if he has a moment, to take a call. The Minister’s Supplementary Order Paper refers to sections 10 to 23 being deferred and coming into force on a date to be appointed by the Governor-General by Order in Council. The remaining provisions will come into force on the day after the date on which the Act receives the royal assent. What does that mean? If we look at the wording in clauses 10 to 23, we notice straight up that we are looking at amendments to the principal Act, that being the Terrorism Suppression Act. People need to remember that this bill enhances, and makes some modifications to, the Terrorism Suppression Act, to make it more effective. Mr Locke has suggested that we should defer the commencement date by 5 years. I ask members of the Committee to take a quiet moment to read clauses 10 to 23, and consider for a moment the impact on our ability to deal with the suppression of terrorism if we deferred this bill for another 5 years. We are talking about improving the principal Act by adding reference to the Nuclear Material Convention and the Plastic Explosives Convention—conventions that we have signed up to, conventions that we have pledged to support, and that we have passed legislation to ratify and make meaningful.

I say to the Minister, what are the implications of deferring the bill for 5 years? Can the Minister help enlighten Mr Locke as to what the implications of a deferment for 5 years would be? Clause 11, “Interpretation”, states: “Section 4 of the principal Act is amended by inserting, in their appropriate alphabetical order, the following definitions: ‘duly authorised military device means an explosive article, including, but not restricted to, shell, bomb—’ ”. We are talking about clauses that I understand are essential in enhancing the Terrorism Suppression Act and making it more meaningful and effective, and to allow us to comply with previous conventions that we as a nation have agreed to.

The notion that we can sit here and breathe through our noses and take time to reflect, ponder, and gaze at our navels, whilst we allow people to “calm down and overcome their fears of terrorism”—unduly founded, as Mr Locke would have us believe—is nonsensical. In the very short time of less than 2 years since the attacks on the twin towers, we have seen bombing incidents all over the world, and terrorism—far from decreasing—is increasing. Soft targets such as New Zealand are considered lambs to the slaughter by people who would further their own political agendas around the world, and there will come a time, as other countries harden their internal defence systems, when places like New Zealand will be seen as the only attractive and viable target.

Hon PHIL GOFF (Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade) : Very briefly, the vast majority of this bill will come into effect as soon as the royal assent is achieved for the Act. However, there are two areas that will come into effect when there is an Order in Council—those are clauses 3 to 7, and clauses 10 to 23. The common-sense reason is that structures need to be put in place, and regulations need to be drawn up, before we can practically implement them, but they will be implemented as soon as possible. There is no question of those provisions being delayed unnecessarily, and certainly not for 5 years. These are measures needed to counter terrorism and other forms of serious crime.

STEPHEN FRANKS (ACT) : The amendment provision gives us the time to think about whether we are panicking, or whether we are rushing. The ACT party believes that clearly there are sensible things that every country must do about terrorism, that evil is real, and that people who do not care about the innocents they hurt in the cause of securing their political objectives are a special kind of threat. The normal response of criminal law to these people should properly take account of the fact that they prey on victims with whom they have no natural connection, who would not normally be seen as targets, and who can therefore feel a particular horror about being victims.

On the other hand, the ACT party is concerned about some of the same factors that Keith Locke raised on behalf of the Greens, though not the concerns about Ahmed Zaoui—the commencement could not come quick enough for us if it related to Ahmed Zaoui. I think the supposition that the Greens and other defenders act on is that he has some kind of entitlement to be here, and, in ACT’s opinion, only New Zealanders have a right to be here. Anyone else is on a privilege, and there is no requirement to extend that privilege simply because someone claims to be a refugee. That is grace and favour, and Mr Zaoui has abused our hospitality.

Coming back to the commencement, I wish that it were being delayed, because I think it is almost inevitable that, in a passion, we do things to our own law that we should not be doing. I look, for example, at the new offence of causing disease or sickness in animals. It looks to me as if someone from the Green Party, for example, could make it an offence to sterilise possums with GM. I know that that is never intended, but the problem is that when people are legislating in a passion, they take these well-meant words and do not look at them closely, simply because there is a panic and a rush to get new powers, or to at least look as if they are trying to give new powers. I use the new clause 298A about causing disease or sickness in animals as an example. At first sight, it could actually make it an offence to spray mosquitoes, but, of course, that is not likely to cause major damage.

But it certainly could be that that clause might one day be used for political purposes to confront people like the Greens who have a genuine concern about a proposed response to an animal pest and, therefore, the criminal law could be misused. It is not fanciful. In the United States a law against mob racketeers has been misapplied in all sorts of spheres, including throughout the securities industry. The “RICO Act”, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act, has been very much misapplied.

Another example of haste is new section 307A, “Threats of harm to people or property” inserted by clause 7. It looks to me as though anti-smokers could be targets, or perhaps people against certain drugs or drug companies, because they will intend to disrupt the commercial activity of a particular kind, and it could be argued that they will, therefore, create a health risk to one or more people. That is just the kind of unintended consequence that a long delay in the commencement could be used to iron out. The Minister should take that on board.

The Minister is aware that I am equally concerned that, unintentionally, he has put hurdles in the path of people who want to use surveillance cameras. If members care to look at the definition of “tracking device” they will find that it covers a surveillance camera, and, as I read it, that says that from now on if the police want to cooperate with a supermarket or even someone who wants to know where his own vehicles are going, they have to go and get a High Court warrant to do it. It is an intrusion on anti-crime effort, and that is a consequence of well-meaning people looking at law in haste and not examining it properly.

The commencement clause should be delayed, and the power to defer by Order in Council should be used in order to go back through this in the cold light of day and examine why we would want to ban the use of surveillance cameras without a High Court warrant, which the legislation appears to do. I normally deplore commencement clauses that depend on a ministerial decision or on the Order in Council process. In this case, delay would be desirable.

MARK PECK (Labour—Invercargill) : I move, That the question be now put.

KEITH LOCKE (Green) : I want to speak on this part because I have some amendments to it, relating particularly to clauses 7 and 8. Clause 7 is about threatening to do harm. One of the problems is that the definition—it is a bit like the definition in the Terrorism Suppression Act, although this is not specifically about terrorism—is very broad, because all one has to do to qualify under this particular clause is to threaten to do something that is going to cause significant disruption to a commercial activity or a civil administration in a way that causes a risk to health, major property damage, major economic loss, or major damage to the national economy of New Zealand. They are very broad terms. People do not actually need to do the act; they can just, even as of now, threaten to do something. For instance, some of the Māori involved in the battle for the foreshore and seabed are getting quite upset about their property rights, as they see them. They are worried about the aquaculture. If they took some action against an aquaculture facility somewhere and caused major economic loss to one or more persons—in fact, they do not need to do it; right now they need just to threaten to do it—then, under this clause, they could be up for quite an extensive period in jail. The terms are so broad that they could be misinterpreted.

I turn to genetic engineering. Of course, most people do not want the release of genetically engineered foods into crops and into the New Zealand environment, but there are people even now who are threatening perhaps to take some sort of non-violent civil disobedience - type direct action in a way that could affect genetically engineered crops, and that action could qualify under the definition in this clause. So just the threat of it now—or when and if this legislation passes, through Order in Council or whatever it is—could mean that people are subject to quite a big penalty.

New section 307A(2), inserted by clause 7—and one of my amendments relates to it—states that any strike, lockout, or other industrial action is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for inferring that a person has committed an offence. This is what is known as a comfort clause. There is a similar clause in the Terrorism Suppression Act. People can be a bit misled and say: “I can be a good protester and I won’t be covered by this clause because of those two words—‘by itself’.” But I have interrogated the officials and the legal people in this respect, and they all say that the clause, in both the Terrorism Suppression Act and in this bill, is just a comfort clause. If someone who is involved in protest action does actually cause the effects I have just described, he or she is still covered, despite this comfort clause. But I have put forward an amendment. If people think that strikes, lockouts, and legitimate protests are protected under this clause, then I have moved an amendment to cut out the two words “by itself” so it would be clear that people involved in strikes, lockouts, industrial action, and other protest action will not be covered by that. But the Green Party is opposed to that whole clause, because, as I said, it is quite dangerous.

The other clause I have an amendment to is clause 8. Clause 8—and this also comes up in Part 3—enables the police to engage in fishing expeditions involving interception devices. There is already a provision for interception devices in the criminal law, in order to try to get drug offenders under warrant, and also in the Crimes Act, in order to get serious offenders. The two amendments to this bill, in Parts 1 and 3, mean that the police can say they want an interception warrant because of a particular offence that they think a person may have committed. Under these amendments, once the police have the interception warrant they can then look for information on all kinds of crimes across the board, basically. If there was a situation of the police misusing their powers a little bit, they could use this measure.

Dr WAYNE MAPP (National—North Shore) : Why is Mr Locke wrong? Because he is wrong. His error starts when he ignores how this section is constructed. People would have to do two things, in fact, not one. Their actions have to intend the effect of one of these offences: they have to affect the civilian population of New Zealand, not just one person but the entire population or a large chunk thereof; and, they have to do something that would threaten an infrastructure facility—something pretty fundamental. The next thing mentioned in the section is the civil administration of the country, and, finally, the commercial activity. These are global concepts—actions cannot be narrowly focused.

• Sitting suspended from 6 p.m. to 7.30 p.m.

Dr WAYNE MAPP: Prior to the dinner break I was explaining why I believe that Mr Locke is wrong, and I have taken this call because the meaning of new section 307A, inserted by clause 7, is an important point.

In essence, two things are required. Firstly, one has to have an “effect”, and, prior to the dinner break, I listed the effects. They are things of widespread significance to New Zealand—that is, affecting our civilian population, the infrastructure facility, civil administration, or commercial activity. These are not individual activities, in my view. They are something of general effect. That is how the words will be interpreted. That is the first test that has to be satisfied—namely, an effect. In addition, a “result” has to be intended. They are: creating a risk to the health of one or more people—admittedly that is narrower, in the sense of numbers; causing major property damage; causing major economic loss to one or more persons; and causing major damage to the national economy of New Zealand. The fact is that those are accumulative requirements—the widespread effect, leading to the result—both of which must be in the contemplation of the person. It is those two things together that would cause the activity to be caught by section 307A.

Then, on top of that, as Mr Locke noted earlier, there is the avoidance provision. So those things are not caught if they are derived from a strike, lockout, industrial action, advocacy, dissent, etc. It is not a complete exemption. Mr Locke has put up a Supplementary Order Paper that would have those as a complete exemption. I believe he is also wrong there. What if the intended outcome of the protest or dissent were this widespread effect, followed with the intended result? Surely one could not be supporting that kind of dissent. After all, one might even argue that Hamas would otherwise be exempted. Yet they conduct terrorist activities on a daily basis, which have these causes, these effects, and these results. So Mr Locke, perhaps unwittingly, perhaps not, is almost advocating terrorism. It is extraordinary that he would do that, and I cannot believe that he would deliberately do that. Even he, I believe, would not deliberately do that. But that is, nevertheless, a necessary consequence of his reasoning.

Because the Government has taken only one call so far on this very important legislation, I believe it is incumbent on me to explain the purposes in detail. This legislation should have the widespread support of the House, and if the Government fails in its duty to explain the purposes in detail, not just in a second reading speech but by analysis of the critical clauses—and certainly new section 307A is in that category—then it behoves the Opposition to undertake that duty. These are important issues.

KEITH LOCKE (Green) : I would like to reply to some of the points that my colleague Wayne Mapp has raised. He is trying to make out, I think unsuccessfully, that the threats of action have to be on some huge scale affecting everything, in order to be covered by this provision. But when we look through the provision, it talks about a threat to cause significant disruption to things like a board of trustees of a school, or commercial activities of a particular type, etc. Obviously, we are not talking about something affecting a whole society; we are talking about threats of action that might affect just one entity, one farmer, or whatever. That is clear in section 307A(1B), in clause 7, where the results have to be of four types. One result is “causing major economic loss to one or more persons”. Therefore, causing major economic loss to one person would qualify.

Another result is “causing major damage to the national economy”. That is a very broad provision, but how does one define that? It requires subjective political determination. Some people would argue that Monsanto, even though it has declined as a company of late, would potentially cause major damage to the national economy of New Zealand with its GE foods. From another viewpoint, others would say that people who threaten to pull out GE crops are causing major damage to the national economy. It depends on where one is coming from.

The examples I gave in my speech first time around are arguments that members might say are the kinds of examples the Greens would give about GE or the Māori debate over the foreshore and how they might affect marine farming. But take the example of farmers—and this is a recent example—threatening to block roads in response to the “fart tax”. That is an action; a threat. Under this provision people need only to threaten; they do not need to carry it through. That is what farmers did; they threatened to block roads because of the “fart tax”. Their action would come under this provision.

Dr Wayne Mapp: Come on! It would not.

KEITH LOCKE: That is real. The member may not like it, but that is the problem, because this is a very broad provision. The result could be determined by political bias.

I want to finish by explaining my amendment to omit clause 8, because that clause could allow for fishing expeditions by the police. The interception warrant under this provision can be taken out for a simple theft charge, when the police suspect a person is guilty of theft, and then a fishing expedition can take place and the person can be had up on a misuse of drugs charge or some other charge. This provision tends to undermine what has happened in the courts to date, whereby judges are a bit careful about evidence and how it is gathered. To allow interception warrants to be granted on one little thing, and then used for a whole wide range of offences, can lead to abuse if the police force did get a little bit out of control and started getting a little biased against certain people, and went on these fishing expeditions.

So it is true, as with any provision that upholds our civil liberties, that, one might say, some criminals are getting away with it because the police got this warrant out on a theft charge and then they caught somebody on this other offence, while using the interception device, and so that is good. But if we want to make sure that the police are not taking out interception warrant after interception warrant, and misusing their powers in this way, then we have to restrict what they can do, more specifically to the purposes of the warrant, and not allow for fishing expeditions.

That is how the law has operated up to date—with a balance between civil liberties, and people not being subject to excessive surveillance, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the police being able to do sufficient to catch most criminals in our society by, in some cases, using interception warrants. I think that both of these amendments are very important. I want to go back and talk about an amendment I raised at the start.

STEPHEN FRANKS (ACT) : I rise for the ACT party, to take the unusual step of supporting Mr Keith Locke’s warnings about these provisions in Part 1. I believe that this has been drafted hastily. It is drafted as a response to this Government’s desire to subordinate New Zealand to the United Nations, and to look respectable. When we renege on defence and other contracts we have to do something to suck up to the Australians and to the Americans. In this case, sadly, it is by using the worthy cause of counter-terrorism to stick new provisions into our law that may well, one day, be misused for purposes that the people in this Parliament would never have dreamt of.

Look at new section 307A, to be inserted by clause 7, which is the new offence of threat of harm to people or property. This amendment has been further amended by recommendation of the select committee, which I am sure thought it was doing the job that was necessary of making sure this law did not overreach. These kinds of provisions often come from countries that have none of our respect for law and order, indeed, and for the rights of individuals, and for the importance of making sure that people are guilty before they are convicted. In this clause there is a 7-year sentence for threatening to do something that might have a result of creating a risk to the health of one or more people.

Dr Wayne Mapp: No, there are two stages.

STEPHEN FRANKS: Hang on. There are two stages, as Mr Mapp quite correctly points out, but taking it bit by bit—

Dianne Yates: Dr Mapp.

STEPHEN FRANKS: Sorry Dr Mapp—yes, Dr Professor Mapp! A threat—“creating a risk to the health of one or more people”. Think about that risk. A risk to the health of one person comes through promoting smoking. It comes through a myriad of activities that might be much better intentioned than promoting smoking. There is a risk to the health of one person if, for example, someone is opposed to a particular kind of therapy that he or she thinks harms many, but helps one or a few people.

Then we look at the other element required for this offence. It causes “a significant disruption of one or more of the following things … commercial activity in New Zealand.” I say to Dr Mapp, let us think about, for example, those who oppose genetic modification. It could easily be that they are hostile to a drug firm that uses or produces a medicine with GM, and want that medicine withdrawn because of their fears about the effect of the technology on a whole range of values in New Zealand. It could be Māori objecting to it because they believe that it is a fundamental problem simply to interfere with the foetus. The result could well be harm to one or more people. This provision does not have an exception for proper purpose, or good faith, or political debate.

Dr Wayne Mapp: Yes it does.

STEPHEN FRANKS: Where is it?

Dr Wayne Mapp: Section 5(2)

STEPHEN FRANKS: That relates only to strikes and lockouts. Typically, this Labour Government has said that if one is in protest, advocacy, or dissent, that does not, by itself, imply the offence. The main provision simply says that there are three elements: a threat, adverse effect to the health of one or more people, and disruption to someone’s commercial activity or a sector’s commercial activity. All of those could be caused in the scenario I have pictured. I would say, coming to it cold, with no more than an hour or two to look at it, if we can think of one scenario in that situation it should be telling this Parliament that this Committee stage in the House should be used to take a much greater care about the potential misuse of this provision. This could well be misused in private prosecutions. This could cause a great deal of misery to New Zealanders who are acting in perfect good faith.

I mention also in Part 1 the provisions relating to causing disease or sickness in animals. I mentioned that the new section 298A would be capable of being used by antagonists to the introduction of a possum disease, if they feared that that possum disease might also spread, for example, to commercial rabbits or poultry. It is perfectly capable of that use.

RON MARK (NZ First) : Listening to the debate, whilst I do recognise and understand the concerns that have been expressed by the various members, this is one area of debate that was given considerable airtime in the select committee process. Many of the concerns that Mr Locke is consistently raising—I give him full credit for the consistency of his views, and for championing of those views—I am perfectly satisfied they have been well canvassed.

Whilst I can accept and understand fully how he might feel that a particular Government’s propensity to carpet-bomb our entire country with 1080 poison might well be construed by some to be an act that is adverse and likely to cause grave economic damage to our economy, if it were to become public knowledge throughout the rest of the world, and might, in some people’s interpretation, be covered by this bill, it would be interesting to know from the Minister himself how this Government would respond to charges brought against it by people on the West Coast and down south who believed that carpet-bombing the Blue Mountains with 1080 poison is, in fact, an act of economic terrorism. Consider the implications to our international markets, to our meat industry, if the world in general found out that we were dumping hundreds of tonnes of 1080 poison—a product that has been specifically banned and outlawed in the United States. Indeed, in the United States they pay bounties of up to $20,000 to individuals who catch other people in the act of distributing 1080 poison. I can understand that, but I was given absolute assurance in the select committee that the way these subclauses have been couched is only to capture people who genuinely, it is believed by the judges responsible for giving such warrants, do pose a threat to the country, the citizens of New Zealand, and its economic stability.

I can well understand how there are many people out there who believe that the mere election of a Labour Government is a threat to the economic stability of this country, and might be construed as an act of terrorism committed upon it by some misguided New Zealanders who voted that way. It might be construed as an act of terrorism committed upon the country by United Party members, who went into one election championing the centre right’s views, and then promptly leapt into bed with Helen Clark in what some people might describe as a gross act of terrorism committed upon this nation. We do say such things with a little bit of tongue-in-cheek.

I understand the concerns expressed by the ACT party and the Green Party with respect to civil liberties, but I am on record as being one who has said on many occasions that we fail to see the wood for the trees when we are focusing on civil liberties. Mr Locke may well say that we are becoming guided by emotion, and we need to take time to pause and consider more widely the implication of clauses 7 and 8. In fact, the checks and balances are most definitely there. If the Minister would care to take a call and allay some of the fears that are raised in the various amendments, it might go a long way to cause some people to reconsider their vote in support of those amendments that have been put forward by Mr Locke.

Civil liberties are important. They are what separate democracies from dictatorships. I understand that. I understand that we have a duty and responsibility to protect the rights of people and their ability to express freely their disapproval of Government policies. But I am not one who looks upon expressions of viewpoints such as those that occurred during the Springbok tour as being a right or proper way in which those people should have been allowed to demonstrate their views. I look upon the Springbok tour demonstrations, which some people held up as an example when we discussed this bill, as acts aided and abetted by gangs, organised crime, and people who had ulterior motives. If this legislation would have seen many of those people locked up, then I, for one, would have been quite happy about that.

Hon PHIL GOFF (Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade) : The provisions in this part can relate to terrorism, and in fact they are aimed at dealing with serious terrorist situations that may arise. Equally, they may relate to other outcomes where serious harm is caused that might not be terrorist inspired. It does not have to be terrorist inspired if people are doing significant property damage or harming the health of individuals, to make that sort of protest or advocacy a crime. As Ron Mark mentioned, if somebody smashed up a property in the course of a Springbok tour protest, then he or she broke the law and should face the weight of the law. I say that as a person who was a Springbok tour protester. Protest is an important right in our democracy, but it does not extend to the right to smash up other people’s property or harm other persons. That then becomes a criminal offence. It always has been that, and always will be.

Why have we put some of the measures in the bill? For example, why have we put a 10-year offence in for causing disease or sickness in animals? I thought that would have been self-evident. We had a study done jointly by Treasury and the Reserve Bank on scenarios forecasting the effects of a limited foot and mouth disease outbreak. One of the most serious forms of terrorism or advocacy in this country could be to deliberately introduce something like bovine spongiform encephalopathy or foot-and-mouth disease.

Ron Mark: Or a threat of it.

Hon PHIL GOFF: Yes, I will come to the threat in a moment. The conservative estimate of the result of somebody doing that to our country would be a loss of around NZ$6 billion in the first year and a cumulative loss of $10 billion in the second year. When we consider the enormity of that, Mr Locke should propose that we have more than a 10-year maximum penalty for somebody who would deliberately cause such chaos in New Zealand.

I listened to Mr Franks’ examples. I think he was perhaps tongue-in-cheek, but the idea that destroying a mosquito population would bring somebody within the scope of this law is patently incorrect. People have to cause a serious risk to the health or safety of an animal population and cause major damage to the national economy of New Zealand. If Mr Franks can follow through on his example and explain how wiping out the mosquitoes or the possums would cause serious damage, then he might have a point.

In relation to clause 7, which is in respect of threats or communicating information about an act that would be likely to have these particular effects, clearly what we are aiming this to do is to deal with the situation that we faced in reality not so long ago with regard to the anthrax hoax. It is a very serious thing, even as a hoax, when people send white powder through the mail purporting that that might be anthrax; or there are the commercially disruptive effects of people saying that they have contaminated a food product on the shelves. Those are forms of terrorism, and crimes. They should be subject to the full weight of the law, and that is what this provision is about—with the safeguards against using those provisions simply against an action because it is advocacy, protest, a strike, or a lockout: those things are not illegal per se. I hope such acts will never be illegal in this country. They will certainly never be illegal under this Government, but when people commit acts that are designed to seriously damage our country, property, and people, then why, I ask Mr Locke, should those people not face the full force of the law?

STEPHEN FRANKS (ACT) : I appreciate the Minister taking the call to explain the reasons why this is important, why it is necessary legislation, and what the intent is. There is no concern from the ACT party about the intent or the need for law in the areas stated. Our concern is about the unintended effects, Law always has unintended effects if it is not carefully drafted, and if there is not a very live concern to look for unintended effects.

Despite Mr Goff’s reference to my flippant remark about wiping out a population of mosquitoes, a far better example was provided by Mr Mark for the New Zealand First party. For example, the white-tailed deer population in the Blue Mountains, or the population in the Hokonuis, is currently under threat from a 1080 attack, through most of that area. Apparently the council that is funding it—or the Animal Health Board—is not prepared to take the precaution of potentially limiting it or using baits that will not appeal to the deer population there. Whatever one may think about the rights and wrongs of the 1080 campaign, it is wrong to leave unnecessarily in our criminal law a new offence that can be used or misused against people who have no criminal intent and who believe that what they are doing is proper.

To be fair, this particular clause states: “without lawful justification or reasonable excuse”. I suspect that a regional council or Environment Southland approval would be seen as a lawful justification or excuse. But what about the councillors themselves? It seems to me that they will face attempts from those who oppose a 1080 campaign to bring them within the boundaries of this; and I think that within the words, it will not be too hard. Taking on board the Minister’s passionate affirmation that the Labour Government would not be attempting to punish someone for a strike, a lockout, or advocacy, that is not the point. Subclause (2) of new clause 307A provides something of an indicator of Parliament’s intent that this provision should not be misused. However, it highlights the fact that there are a range of other activities that should have been similarly mentioned to signify to the courts that the elements of the offence could well be satisfied, yet there should still not be liability.

The lawful justification or reasonable excuse will, I submit, be in the eye of the beholder. When passion is aroused, when the drug company, for example, is in the gun and there is demonstrated potential harm to the health of one or more people, even though there is also demonstrated benefit to far more, this provision does not, on its face, require a balancing. For example, that might have been a sensible subclause (3), to enable the court to take into account the motives and the weighing of priorities and the balancing, so that even though a commercial activity is significantly disrupted, and even though there is a risk to the health of one or more people, it would still be justified because there is a balance.

Dr Wayne Mapp: What about clause 2?

STEPHEN FRANKS: I say to Dr Mapp that clause 2 by itself is not a sufficient basis for inferring. I am talking not about inference, but actual proof. We could have all of these things. When we have a threat to do an act that is likely to disrupt commercial activity and spread anxiety about the drug companies’ activities, and we have the risk to the health of one or more people, we have satisfied the elements of the offence. I believe that if this Government had been doing its work properly it should have been more alive to the risks and should have been able to come up with better-crafted exceptions.

Hon LIANNE DALZIEL (Minister of Commerce) : I move, That the question be now put.

KEITH LOCKE (Green) : I have been criticised a little bit in the discussion, and I would like to reply briefly. I appreciate Mr Goff getting up and making some comments. It is very good that he is explaining the position. I disagree with him, because he said that terrorists could be doing these things, but the examples we have come up with—and we could go on and on giving different examples—are from our domestic political situation. The reality is that, apart from the Rainbow Warrior bombing in 1985, there is not a lot of terrorist activity in New Zealand. This provision in the Crimes Act has a general application, including against any terrorist who might happen to threaten, but its application is overwhelmingly in relation to domestic political activity. There has not been a terrorist threat against New Zealand to date that I know of.

But there have been all kinds of threats from ordinary New Zealanders. I mentioned the threat of farmers on the so-called “fart tax”. It is good that Mr Goff brought us back to the 1981 Springbok tour protest. Certainly, if we are talking about threats and not actions—and this part is about threats—there were all sorts of threats before and during that Springbok rugby tour to get involved in disruptive process. The leadership of the anti-tour movement was saying that if the Springbok team came here, there would be disruptive activities, the blocking of motorways, etc., and that transpired. So this provision would definitely have covered the anti - Springbok tour protesters. The blocking of motorways does have a fairly significant effect, as happened at that time.

Under clause 6, one does not actually need to disrupt very much to have the result, under section 298B(b), of causing major economic loss to one person—a single, solitary New Zealander, as long as that person is part of a commercial activity of a particular type, or in a particular school, or something like that. This is just about a threat—

Stephen Franks: Competition does that—causes major economic loss.

KEITH LOCKE: Yes. So I think we have to see that this is a quite dangerous provision. I think the Minister said that protests “per se” are not being outlawed or affected by this, which is a sort of synonym for the “by itself” provision in section 307A(2), in clause 7. In the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, on both this bill and the Terrorism Suppression Bill, which became an Act, it was made quite clear repeatedly by officials and submitters that “by itself” did not mean that if one was on a protest or in a strike, and personally did the things that are prescribed in the legislation, one would not be as liable as anyone else; all that that provision is trying to say is that we are not aiming to get at protests or strikes as a whole, but if strikers or protesters happened to threaten to do something that would significantly disrupt a commercial institution and cause major economic loss to one person, then they can be up for 7 years in jail.

Hon Phil Goff: The court is hardly likely to rule in that way.

KEITH LOCKE: The Minister can say that, but it has to be based on what the law says. At the present time, sure, we have a more tolerant climate politically and judicially, but if there is a situation—and I again go back to the 1981 Springbok tour—where passions are raised and people on different sides are saying that those on the other side are bringing the country to ruin and all the rest of it, all the things that Muldoon threw around, then one might get a situation where people are given heavy sentences for just doing a political protest in a situation of great dissent and great concern. In that case, a racist rugby team was being brought to New Zealand and people felt very upset about it, not only because of what was happening in South Africa but because of the impact on race relations in New Zealand.

RON MARK (NZ First) : In the interests of ensuring that history is not rewritten according to people’s foggy memory of what happened in 1981, let me remind Mr Locke, and make it clear to the Chair, what actually happened. But, firstly, I want to thank the Minister of Transport for standing up and taking a call; it is unusual under this Government to have a Minister take a call during the Committee stage, and I really do appreciate it. Let me remind people that if this bill would catch people who protested against the Springbok tour by wearing helmets, carrying shields, and wielding batons, then that is good—it would do what it needs to do. If this bill would catch a person who threatens to fly an aircraft into a packed grandstand full of people, then that is good. That is what this bill is intended to do—to curb threats of terrorism, and to curb acts of terrorism. If this bill would stop people from peacefully protesting outside rugby grounds, holding their placards, chanting their chants, and calling for the rugby match to be cancelled, then I would not be happy, because that is people’s right—to protest, demonstrate peacefully, and exercise their democratic will.

We discussed those very problems at length during the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee meetings. I do not share the Green Party’s view that this legislation would curb peaceful protest or peaceful demonstration. But if this bill stops people from hiring the Mongrel Mob to spearhead the front-end of their protest march, which sought to knock down fences, invade pitches, knock people over, cancel a game, and cause massive economic loss, job loss, and loss of a day’s pay to ordinary citizens, then I am not fazed by that, because I do not see any of those actions as being their democratic right. People have a democratic right, fought and paid for with the blood of our forebears in places marked on the wall of this Chamber, but it is not a right to inflict their will upon people by force of arms. That is what I saw during the Springbok tour. We are all too glib at saying: “Oh, these champions, these heroes, went out there and peacefully demonstrated.” What a load of rubbish! Pull out the videos!

Hon Lianne Dalziel: I did, and I was proud to be on the Springbok march.

RON MARK: Yes, there were people who did. That honourable member might have been one of those people who demonstrated peacefully, but there were people in the front ranks—it can be seen on the replay videos, on the old films, if members want to pull them out of the archives and look at them—who were gang members. They might well have been exercising a democratic right, but some of us believe that they were there for the punch-up, the destruction, the mayhem, and to inflict anarchy upon normal New Zealanders. Some people in this Committee might find some sort of credit or pride in being associated with people like that; well, I do not. If this bill deals with people who will not protest peacefully, then that is not necessarily a bad thing. If it deals with people who threaten to fly an aircraft into a packed grandstand so that a game would be called off, then that is a good thing. But I remain absolutely assured, from the explanations that the select committee had—from the long and lengthy discussion, and from the amendments that were made—that it does not seek to curb one’s right to protest and peacefully demonstrate against laws, Acts, or regulations that the Government may inflict upon us.

JILL PETTIS (Junior Whip—Labour) : I move, That the question be now put.

• Motion agreed to.
• The question was put that the following amendment in the name of Keith Locke to clause 7 be agreed to:

to omit this clause.

The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson): The amendment to clause 8 in the name of Keith Locke to omit that clause is now out of order as it is inconsistent with a previous decision of the Committee.

KEITH LOCKE (Green) : I have a few amendments to this part, which amends the Terrorism Suppression Act. We need to go back, because the amendments in Part 2 relate to the definition in the Terrorism Suppression Act. My amendments will improve the definition, and in so doing, improve the bill.

My first amendment is to insert new clause 14B, which changes the definition of a terrorist act. At present the definition has two aspects. First, a terrorist act has to be for “an ideological, political, or religious cause, and with the intention to induce terror in a civilian population.” I wish to keep that part in the definition, but I wish to eliminate the section that states “to unduly compel or force a Government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing, any act.” As I think was implied earlier in the debate, what does the term “unduly compel” really mean? Any sort of legal protest action or strike could be seen to be unduly compelling. Governments often feel that they are being unduly pushed around by the Post Primary Teachers Association, perhaps the farmers marching on Parliament, or whoever it happens to be. It would be best to knock out those words and just have “with the intention to induce terror in a civilian population”.

My next amendment, which is to insert new clause 14C, deletes section 5(3)(d) of the principal Act. The problem at the moment is that section 5(3)(d) states that an outcome can be “serious interference with, or serious disruption to, an infrastructure facility, if likely to endanger human life:” Under that provision, one does not have to intend to endanger human life; one could just be performing an action that is likely to endanger human life, so it is best taken out. Again, the provision could apply to major strikes or demonstrations, particularly if they affected hospitals or things like that—one could say that they endangered human life. We want to restrict terrorism to what is said in clause 5(2)(a), which is “to induce terror in a civilian population.” If that is done, and then followed up by the outcomes being death, or other serious bodily injury, or serious risk to health, then we are getting into legislation what is generally understood to be people’s concerns about terrorism.

To somewhat repeat the debate we had on the previous part, there is that comfort clause in the Terrorism Suppression Act that says that “to avoid doubt, the fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy, or dissent, or engages in any strike, lockout, or other industrial action, is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for inferring”… etc. etc. Again, I think it would be best to move an amendment to withdraw those two words “by itself”, so that it is quite clear that people engaged in protests and that sort of thing are not covered by that definition of terrorism.

My fourth amendment relates to United Nations Security Council information. At the present time there is a rather strange provision in section 31 of the Act that states that information from the United Nations Security Council “is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, sufficient evidence of the matters to which it relates.” We are just taking as gospel virtually what comes down from the United Nations Security Council. Of course, we all respect the United Nations, but from what I have been able to find out, the Security Council does not have a full legal process when it works out its list of terrorist organisations. It is more a process of some country—most likely the United States—saying “here is a list of terrorist organisations.” It could also be another country, as that would depend who was the dominant force in the United Nations at the time, or who swung a bit of weight. Those “terrorist” organisations are rubber-stamped by the Security Council, sent out, and countries like New Zealand might adopt them.

Dr WAYNE MAPP (National—North Shore) : I was anticipating in the previous call that Mr Locke would state that he would vote in favour of this part. It is a reasonable request when one considers what the part is about, and it is not really about what he was talking about. This part is about implementing two conventions—one in relation to nuclear material and the other in relation to plastic explosives. I would have thought that even the Green Party would want to put on record that it is opposed to those things. Did we hear that statement from them? Unfortunately, Mr Locke did not say that. He had the opportunity, and maybe he will have a further opportunity, but he needed to say it.

The reason that he needed to say it is that it is a statement of one’s values. Are we willing to be upfront and say that the worst forms of terrorism are surely plastic explosives and nuclear materials? Surely, we would say we were against those things. What Mr Locke actually spoke about were various provisions in new clauses 14B, 14C, 14D, and 14E. Those provisions, which were not properly explained by him, are all about revisiting the terrorism Act, and his general obsessions and concerns are there, too. At best, that is peripheral. It might be important to him to talk about that, even if the rest of us think it somewhat irrelevant, but at least this Committee could have been assured.

I would like to think that the vote on Part 2 will be unanimous—118 votes, unless the Progressive coalition turns up—but at least that the people present actually voted for Part 2 as an affirmative statement that in relation to plastic explosives, nuclear material, and harbouring terrorists, we are as one. I know that is an extraordinary concept within this Parliament, but in this country there must be some minimum line or common ground by which we can all say that those things have to be prohibited.

Hon David Cunliffe: Does it include the Wild Greens?

Dr WAYNE MAPP: The question has been asked as to whether that includes the Wild Greens. I would ask whether the Green Party is the Wild Greens, because if Green members do not vote for this part, that is exactly what they are.

Mr Locke has taken one call on issues in this part, but he needs to take another to say that he will vote for the two relevant conventions. After all, one of the reasons the Government introduced this bill to the House was to implement those conventions. They make up an interlocking network of anti-terrorist conventions by the United Nations—an organisation not favoured by everyone in this House—and expresses pretty much universal human consent that certain activities have to be condemned in the most serious ways.

Obviously, National supports those provisions. We are not putting up amendments to this part, but are taking the opportunity to say that, on these issues, we expect all New Zealanders to have a common view and to vote for those provisions.

RON MARK (NZ First) : I rise to put on the record that New Zealand First will be voting in support of Part 2. The two conventions are specifically identified and detailed in the schedule as new schedules 2A and 2B, and they are there for everybody to read. Even the strongest critic of this legislation should see that it is eminently sensible, I would have thought, that we sign up to those United Nations conventions. I take, for example, the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection. That convention seeks to obligate the signatory countries to ensure that plastic explosives that are manufactured in each country contain identifying agents, so that they can be clearly identified by any of the law enforcement agencies that seek to provide security for aircraft, buildings, or anything that may be a terrorist target. Failure to comply with such international standards is to invite acts of terrorism. People who are caught moving, manufacturing, or in possession of such explosives can quite clearly be considered to be people who have only one intent in mind. There is no other reason to utilise such explosives.

The provisions in Part 2 that deal with sentencing for offences relating to harbouring or concealing terrorists could, if anything, be criticised as being a little light. The penalty for harbouring a known terrorist is a term of imprisonment not exceeding 7 years.

Dr Wayne Mapp: But then they’ll get parole.

RON MARK: But they are eligible for parole at the one-third mark, so they will be on home detention 6 months shy of 2 years, and then out on parole. That is hugely light. The penalty for the use and movement of unmarked plastic explosives is a $500,000 fine and/or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years, which seems eminently sensible to me.

For the life of me, I cannot understand why a party that is so much in favour of a nuclear-free policy would not express its support at the first opportunity for this part of the bill. Failure to express that support immediately brings into question once again that party’s commitment. But we have seen, with regard to the GE issue, that the very same party, when it had the opportunity to flex its muscles and demand that the moratorium be extended, did not do so. It rolled over backwards. And we have New Zealanders being denied access to the Privy Council because the Green Party, it may be said, is not serious about the sorts of policies that its members say they hold so dear. But there is another speech or two to go on this part, and maybe Mr Locke can assure us that he is serious about a nuclear-free policy and support for this part of the bill.

Hon PHIL GOFF (Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade) : This part is important, for a couple of reasons. The first reason is that it enables us in New Zealand to ratify the last two of 12 international conventions against terrorism. It is important that we do that; it brings us into line with international requirements. We will probably be one of the first countries in the region that has ratified all 12 conventions, and that is something we should be proud of. I think Mr Locke would generally support that. If he did not, I would want to know why. Clearly, we do not want people to be trafficking in unmarked plastic explosives or radioactive materials. One of the major threats to us would be the linking of terrorist groups with precursor materials or actual materials used in weapons of mass destruction. There have to be offences in relation to that. These provisions achieve that end, and I hope that they get widespread support.

The other major change is that the bill gives the Customs Service the power to detain terrorist property. The key thing—and the gap that existed—was the ability of terrorists to literally carry a suitcase full of cash across the border. People who follow terrorist activities or the activities of drug traffickers—and often they are one and the same thing—know that that is the preferred way of shifting assets. We want to get our hands on those assets before the event of a terrorist attack, and not allow them to be used for a terrorist attack. That also fulfils one of the requirements under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, in terms of the funding of terrorism.

I am against the amendments that have been moved by Mr Locke. He is relitigating a decision already made by the House with regard to the definition of a terrorist act in the Terrorism Suppression Act. The other point that I find quite incredible is his questioning of the sufficiency of the United Nations’ information in relation to the designation of terrorist entities. I say to Mr Locke that he cannot be a part-time multilateralist. Either he is in favour of, and stands behind, the multilateral organisations, or he does not. He cannot criticise others for being unilateralist when it suits them, and then be unilateralist himself. Those designations are made only after proper work is done by an international body, representing 192 countries, and the decisions are often without controversy. Why the member would want to remove that provision from the bill is quite beyond me, unless he does not believe in designating terrorist activities and being able to take effective action against them. Equally, others of his deletions would stop us being able to seize the assets of a terrorist group that was carrying money across the border. We have to seize the assets if there is reasonable cause to suspect that that is the case, and then we have the safeguards to apply afterwards. We cannot do it the other way round, because that would not work.

The impression the member leaves the Committee with, deliberately or otherwise, is that he deliberately wants to sabotage efforts that would enable us to stop terrorist activities. It is no good to say that we have not had terrorist activities in New Zealand yet, so therefore we do not need these provisions. We need these provisions to ensure that we do not have future terrorist activities here, to ensure that New Zealand is not the weak link in the chain that can be exploited by terrorist activities, and to meet our international obligations. I thoroughly reject the amendments that the member has put forward.

KEITH LOCKE (Green) : First off, I would like to clear up a point that others have raised about whether the Green Party supports the bits in this part relating to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection. We do support them, as I made clear in my first and second reading speeches. If members look at the minority report from the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee that I authored, they will see that it states: “The Green member supports those amendments to the Terrorism Suppression Act bringing New Zealand into compliance with the Nuclear Materials Convention and the Plastic Explosives Convention.” The problem I face, of course, with regard to how to vote on this bill—which is a problem a lot of members face—is that while this part contains that very good provision, there are also some very bad provisions. So the Green Party, on balance, will not be voting for this part. But, of course, we welcome the fact that we will be adhering to that convention; this is just a normal problem that confronts members in the Committee stage of a bill.

I want to complete what I was in the middle of explaining about eliminating the provision that enables United Nations Security Council information to be treated as sufficient evidence for the designation of a terrorist entity. The issue is not that we should refuse to accept United Nations Security Council information and say that it is all bad and all wrong, because clearly a lot of it is not like that. But when we, as a country, receive that material as a result of a Security Council decision, we should then put our own legal scrutiny on it, and ask whether it is right. Sometimes it is wrong. In fact, we have had to amend our legislation, and we are in the process of doing so—it is in this bill here—because stuff designating terrorists that has come through from the Security Council has been found to be wrong. If the UN then sent out another thing saying it was sorry, but it had got things wrong with regard to certain organisations, under the Terrorism Suppression Act we had no way of amending our own designations to take account of the fact that the United Nations Security Council had made a mistake.

We have to interrogate that information ourselves and put our own eyes on it, because the process itself is done in New York. In fact, the Minister can correct me and explain the court process whereby terrorist bodies are designated, and whether they have any rights at all to come before the UN. I ask the Minister whether it is a process where there is a serious legal challenge of the evidence at the Security Council level. I do not necessarily think there is such a challenge. We do have to have the right, as supporters of the UN, to be able to interrogate any decision. One of the problems with the United Nations, as the Minister well knows, is that the Security Council can sometimes make wrong decisions, because of its unequal structure and the power, particularly, of the United States, but in general of the five permanent members. One can be a very consistent multilateralist without necessarily accepting the decisions of that organisation any more than we just accept, and do not criticise, the decisions of any political body—for example, of this Parliament. We have to abide by the laws of this Parliament, but we can still criticise its decisions.

I go on to my final amendment in this series. It relates to the question of customs officers, and the Minister has referred to that. My particular concern is that the New Zealand Customs Service, which is not a skilled political agency of the State—that is not its task—is allowed under this provision to detain property, not only from bodies that are designated as terrorist bodies but also from entities that are eligible for designation. A customs officer may say he or she thinks some property is from an organisation that may at some time in the future be designated as a terrorist organisation, so he or she will snaffle it now. The Minister says that the Government is guarding against all possibilities, or words to that effect. But the reality is that if Mr Franks comes into the country the customs officer may say he or she thinks Mr Franks may be designated a terrorist next week, because the officer has heard some rumours about him, and therefore he or she will seize Mr Franks’ bag. Mr Franks may, at that point, be the head of a big company. The minute that word gets out that his suitcase has been seized—by the Customs Service, not by a political body—on the grounds that he may in future be designated a terrorist, his perhaps multimillion-dollar company is banged dead, because he is a suspected terrorist.

JILL PETTIS (Junior Whip—Labour) : I move, That the question be now put.

STEPHEN FRANKS (ACT) : The Committee stage of this bill produces strange bedfellows, and not only at this end of the Chamber. I was very interested to hear the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, who again, creditably, took a call, to explain the purpose of Part 2 and what the objectives are. I was interested to hear him say, I think correctly, that the primary gain from this measure, and his main pride in it, was that it enabled us to be the first country in the region to sign up to 12 conventions.

Hon Phil Goff: No, I didn’t say that in that context, at all. The member should have listened to what I said.

STEPHEN FRANKS: I am afraid that is the way I read it. The Minister did explain the substantive reasons for it, but he spent more time gloating at the credit he will get from his colleagues at the United Nations for having been an early signer of those conventions. I ask Mr Ron Mark to think about that. That motive is probably why we have the Mercenary Activities (Prohibition) Bill before the House—the desire to look respectable to people whom most of us would not even want to be seen with; Mr Goff’s desire to be seen holding hands with Yasser Arafat. We are looking at nauseating crawling.

I wonder whether any of this is related to the forthcoming visit of the President of China. As I read section 5 of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, China could argue that its treatment of Falun Gong falls within it. In New Zealand, “to unduly compel or to force a government … to do or abstain from doing any act” would probably, to most people, involve an illegal act, some kind of threat of violence, something that all of us would already recognise as completely unlawful, and the definition of a “terrorist act” simply brings it in. However, we can well imagine that the Chinese, whose President is about to be hosted by Mr Goff, would consider that they were unduly compelled by a bunch of elderly people doing exercises in a courtyard, because for them it is undue to have disagreement.

Dr Wayne Mapp: Do you reckon they will have another select committee inquiry?

STEPHEN FRANKS: Exactly. For those people, it is undue to disagree with their Government. I say to the Minister that the problem is that, as I read this—and I am anxious to be told if I have misread it—as I look at the elements of a “terrorist act”, the only one that I can see that would possibly protect us from an anti - Falun Gong type of move is the one in section 5(3) that requires that there be a serious risk to health or safety. My problem is that many dictators argue that they can suppress dissent because it would cause riots. In Islamic countries, they argue that they can suppress missionaries because, otherwise, they would incite Islamists against them. As I read this section and go through Part 2, it does appear to me that the President of China, for example, could call on our Prime Minister to hand over, under the extradition treaty, someone who had done something that in New Zealand would never be treated as terrorism, but under the law of a country like that might well be defined as terrorism, in a cynical act of political oppression.

That is why I agree with Mr Keith Locke that this part does raise serious questions about whether it could be misused, despite the very sensible parts of it and the things that we would love to be able unequivocally to support. The fact is the select committee did not look at section 5 of the Terrorism Suppression Act, and did not take the opportunity to modify it to make sure there was a definition, consistent with New Zealand’s respect for human rights, as to what is undue compulsion of a Government. This leaves me with the concern that this provision could be used to seize the cash of organisations or political movements. Governments that we regard with abhorrence, in terms of their attitudes to dissent and their attitudes to minorities, could use it to seize that cash.

DAVID BENSON-POPE (Senior Whip—Labour) : I move, That the question be now put.

• Motion agreed to.
• The question was put that the amendments set out on Supplementary Order Paper 164 in the name of the Hon Phil Goff to Part 2 be agreed to.
• Amendments agreed to.

• The question was put that the following amendment in the name of Keith Locke to clause 14B be agreed to:

to insert the following new clause:

14BInducing terror sufficient

Section 5(2)(b) of the principal Act is deleted.

KEITH LOCKE (Green) : I have a few amendments under this part. The first is an amendment to a section of the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act 1978. It is similar to an amendment I moved concerning the Crimes Act, in the debate on Part 1. I was worried about the fishing expeditions that could be launched by the police; that they could get a warrant—in this case, under the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act—and use it for fishing expeditions in relation to a number of other offences. I will not go over that whole argumentation, because it is basically the same as I used on an amendment to Part 1.

The next amendment I have is to clause 33, which drew considerable discussion by very reputable people in the community, including lawyers and lecturers, etc., who were against this provision. They saw it as affecting a common-law right against self-incrimination. Several people submitted to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on this clause. The problem is that a search warrant can be gained by the police, under the inserted section, for any offence at all—even the smallest of offences. The constable can enter the home of the person or tenant, and if he or she owns or has a computer—as most people do these days—that police officer can demand to be given access to it and everything on it. The problem with that is that the person has to give encryption devices, passwords, ways to get around firewalls, etc., in order that the entire contents of that computer are made available to the constable, even if the warrant is for the most minimal of crimes.

I do not know about other members of Parliament, but I know that most of us have a lot of our lives on a computer. It can have our very intimate correspondence, and often our files go back years. There are hundreds and thousands of communications and all kinds of things on our computers, and a humble police officer going into our places for a small offence could have access to them and force us to incriminate ourselves, which is against that common law.

Again, there is a safety provision. We have talked about these comfort provisions. New subsection (2A) of section 198B, inserted by clause 33, states: “A person may not be required under subsection (1) to give any information tending to incriminate the person.”, but the next two subsections go on to state that if information tending to incriminate the person is on the computer, it has to be provided by that person, who has to give those encryption devices. If general information elsewhere in the apartment, let us say, tends to incriminate the person, he or she does not need to give it. So there seems to be a bit of a contradiction in this provision, and I think it is wisest to abide by the wisdom of the many legal people who submitted to our select committee, and to eliminate this provision.

My next three amendments relate to the tracking provisions in clause 34. I was a bit concerned that the tracking provisions available to the police could be used for virtually any offence, so I wanted the word “serious” to be put before the word “offence”, in the new subsection 200B(2)(a). The two really substantive amendments that I want to move came from the Privacy Commissioner, who made a substantial submission to the select committee. He put forward two ideas, one of which relates to these warrants. In particular, when an interception device is put on a person, or vehicle, or whatever it is—interception devices are very tiny things, and can be put on people quite easily—prior to the gaining of a warrant, then there should be some report as to why that happened, because we do not want the police to get into the habit of putting tracking devices on a person prior to a warrant being issued.

Dr WAYNE MAPP (National—North Shore) : Part 3 of this legislation perhaps caused the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee the most difficulty. The reason—as has been explained in the second reading speeches, and in other speeches—is that this bill goes much broader than just terrorism offences. The three powers relating to the interception of private communications, the use of tracking devices, and the requiring of people with knowledge of computer systems to assist with access to them relate not just to terrorist offences but to other offences, as well.

Mr Locke would have one believe that those powers relate to virtually all offences. I say that that is not correct, and he would need only to look at clause 26 to see that it is not the case. The provisions relate specifically to serious, violent offences. Many of those offences—as, no doubt, the Minister will say shortly—relate to terrorism, but they are not related only to terrorism. They relate to other criminal and drug offences of a serious kind, including the full range of cannabis offences. So the term “specified offence” is not the broad category that Mr Locke would have us believe. It applies to the serious end of offences. That is why National, after carefully considering the issues, decided it should support those provisions. In the fight against crime, and particularly against serious crime, the police obviously have to have the appropriate powers. That does not apply just to terrorist offences but also to other serious crimes.

National’s concern related to introducing those general powers through a Counter-Terrorism Bill. We believed, initially, that it would be better to split the bill into two parts and refer the general provisions to the Justice and Electoral Committee, or possibly to the Law and Order Committee. The Minister and his officials made submissions to the select committee as to why that could not be the case. The essence of the argument turned on the fact that these powers were necessary now to deal with terrorist offences, and the fact that other offences were included was a matter the select committee had to be able to take into account. The Minister’s staff was sufficiently flattering to suggest that the select committee, amongst its personnel, had sufficient expertise to be able to make a fair and proper assessment of the provisions. Indeed, on either side of the table at the select committee there were people skilled in legal issues who were able to make those determinations. So the argument was made and was accepted by the Opposition, and therefore we are supporting those provisions.

However, I would re-state to the Minister our concerns about the titles of bills, so that people are properly informed as to the full extent of bills. I would not like to see a bill presented to Parliament again under the label of “counter-terrorism”, or under some such other label—perhaps on a completely different issue, for that matter—that covered not just the things that the title obviously implied but also much broader issues. We would like to think, as a select committee—and we did make reference to this in our report—that the Government has taken that particular issue on board.

I want to close by saying that Mr Locke, once again, grossly overstated his case. It is one of those situations where he has produced somewhat far-fetched scenarios, cast doubt on the general integrity of our democratic society and the institutions therein—Parliament, the judges, and the police—and would have us believe that we live in some sort of totalitarian State, or at least if we do not live in a totalitarian State, then all the machinery is there and the agencies of State are just waiting to seize the opportunity to grossly infringe the liberty of New Zealanders. I say that, ultimately, the sense of liberty of a people does not depend on the law but depends on the hearts of the people.

STEPHEN FRANKS (ACT) : Part 3 is the part that really speaks to me of Government incompetence. After all the time the Government has had to get this bill right, it is appalling that the bill is now so technically deficient. This is the part about which the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, in its report, made it plain that it thought that tracking devices are used by only the police and the Customs Service, and therefore it had created a code to govern the use of tracking devices in New Zealand.

When I look at the definition of “tracking device”—and I have drawn this to the attention of the Minister, but have received no explanation worthy of that description—I see the definition is that it is a device that: “may be used to help ascertain, by electronic or other means, either or both of the following: (a) the location of a thing or person:”. That could be a pair of binoculars. A pair of binoculars is a tracking device, as is a telescope, a public surveillance camera, and, probably, a flag attached to a bicycle if it helps one to locate a person or thing. It probably also applies to a sticker put on a suitcase so that one can identify it on a baggage carousel. What a stupid piece of law it is when all those things can be tracking devices and, suddenly, according to the select committee, the only people who use them are the police and customs agencies, and the committee then makes a set of rules that requires them to apply to a High Court or District Court judge for a warrant.

This is the type of law we get when we rush through—under cover of a great need, anti-terrorism—a complete new code to cover something that should be completely lawful. There is no reason on earth why ordinary citizens cannot decide to put surveillance cameras on their own properties to locate things or people entering their properties. There is no reason why people should have to apply to the police or customs to install global positioning system trackers in their trucks, to see whether those trucks are going to unlawful locations. What about the expectation that an employer will keep his or her employees safe and free from harm, and, for example, prevent the use of company vehicles for transporting drugs? There is no reason why a tracking device should not be used by any individual in relation to his or her own property. But this part does not cover that. I have talked to members of the select committee. Dr Mapp has offered no reason, other than that it had not been thought of, to explain why a police flag on a bicycle, a sticker on a suitcase, or a pair of binoculars should now require, as the law provides for, a warrant from a judge.

When the select committee members said they thought that only the police and the Customs Service used tracking devices, they were clearly wrong. When the select committee members thought they were rejecting the Privacy Commissioner’s nonsense—because the Privacy Commissioner did come up with his typical nonsense about another set of rules on tracking devices—they did not achieve that. The select committee may have thought it was leaving ordinary citizens and the police free to track their own property and to use surveillance cameras if they wished in their own stores or houses. But it appears to me that they have not done so. The commentary on the bill makes the situation worse.

I have put forward a simple amendment. It is hastily drafted, but I believe that it deals with 90 percent—not all, but 90 percent—of the error in this part. The amendment simply provides that this part does not apply in a way that would restrict the owner or the user of a property from consenting to a tracking device on his or her own property. That should be absolutely self-evident. We have the Minister in the chair when the House is in Committee so that the Minister can respond to this kind of thing at the last minute. We have that precisely so that the Minister can apply common sense and the judgment of reality to law, and Parliament can amend bills before it is too late.

RON MARK (NZ First) : I rise to confirm that New Zealand First will be voting for Part 3. But in recognition of the concerns raised by the honourable Stephen Franks, specifically in respect of the definition of “tracking devices”, and after giving his thoughts some consideration, I would actually like—and I know that the Minister has been in a deep discussion with officials—to hear an explanation as to why we should not vote for Mr Franks’ amendment. I have some concerns about tracking devices. I think that television cameras are actually tracking devices, as well, and I am not sure that I would like to see them specifically excluded. But no doubt there will be some explanation as to why we are where we are.

As I go back through the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee’s report on the bill, I think there was some concern—and Mr Franks was quite correct; there was quite some considerable discussion—about the use of tracking devices. We did discuss the practicalities of preventing customs officers and the police from immediately placing tracking devices on baggage and on goods that were coming in through our international airports. We accepted that it is not always possible to seek warrants and to gain judicial approval in time to allow us to slap devices on some people—or on their property—as they enter our country. We hear time and time again that the funds for terrorist operations come from anywhere possible, and that drug-running, gunrunning, and those sorts of illicit activities are always a good source of revenue for terrorists. The movement of recreational drugs—which I understand the Greens are not averse to—such as copious quantities of marijuana and other recreational drugs across our borders is of concern to New Zealand First, and specifically if the profits gained from that go towards funding terrorist activities. There have been occasions where such goods have arrived in the country to be picked up—bags and suchlike. We have seen the Minister of Customs announce some rather hefty drug busts in the last month or so, and I give full credit to the Customs Service for those busts. I think we need to be very aware that customs officers need to be able to react promptly, but lawfully, in such instances, in order that we are able to track the movement of goods, and thereby detain and arrest the people involved in those activities.

But, again, noting Mr Franks’ concerns, I think the definition of “tracking devices” probably does need a little further explanation. If we need to include television cameras, then maybe we should do that. I really would defer to the Minister, so that he can offer some explanation as to why his officials do not think we need to amend that definition, or amend that clause, as recommended by Mr Franks. I look forward to an explanation of that from the Minister.

STEVE CHADWICK (Labour—Rotorua) : I move, That the question be now put.

KEITH LOCKE (Green) : When I finished speaking earlier in the debate I was halfway through explaining my amendments, and the amendments proposed by the Privacy Commissioner to the select committee. The first amendment related to the reporting procedure prior to the gaining of a warrant.

The other thing that the Privacy Commissioner was worried about was that there was nothing in the bill that made it illegal for ordinary members of the public to track other members of the public, virtually wherever they wanted. He proposed an amendment, which I have listed here, that does make it illegal to do that, except in certain circumstances. Essentially, the amendment to clause 34, to add a new section 200P, states that a person commits an offence who knowingly installs, uses, or maintains a tracking device to determine the geographical location of a person or an object, and, in the case of a device, to determine the location of a person without the express or implied consent of that person, or to determine the location of an object without the express or implied consent of a person in lawful possession or having lawful control of that object. So that would allow, for instance, for taxi companies to use tracking devices. Every taxi-driver who is employed by a company like Co-op Taxis in Auckland or Wellington Combined Taxis knows that those companies have a global positioning system, a tracking device. It is all done with the consent of the drivers. They know when they drive taxis that it is part of their job. So that would allow for legitimate tracking devices, with consent.

But what the Privacy Commissioner wanted to stop was the proliferation of ordinary citizens tracking other people. It can be done with very tiny, micro devices these days—and they will get smaller and smaller. A person can attach it to another’s jacket, and he or she can track that person for months. One can track which room in a house a person is in, and all kinds of things. That invasion of privacy was what the Privacy Commissioner was trying to get at. He said there should be this general provision. He made the effort to word an amendment, which I am putting forward here today. I think it is important, because this section does involve privacy.

The other provision I referred to was a police constable who is holding a search warrant for even the most minimal offence, being able to force access to a person’s computer and being able to force that person to give over encryption devices and passwords.

There were quite substantial submissions to the select committee. One was from Alex Conte, a lecturer in law, I think, at Victoria University.

He was very concerned. He went right through all the common law, and how this was an invasion of the person’s privacy and countered their right to avoid self-incrimination. If one is forced to give someone free access to one’s computer, one might incriminate oneself. He did believe that there might be an extreme category of people who are terrorists, and we might need to get into their computers. He did have an amendment that allowed access to computers in that particular case. He was very worried about it, as were many other members of the legal profession.

I think it is important, and people are saying it more and more in the international debate on terrorism, not to get carried away and bring in all sorts of laws that seriously intrude on people’s privacy or, the other edge of it, to try to protect privacy more. Of course, this section does not amend the Terrorism Suppression Act. It amends the Crimes Act, the Summary Proceedings Act, and the Misuse of Drugs Act. But it does have provisions, like the two provisions that affect our privacy very much. I think we should respect the good work of the previous Privacy Commissioner, Bruce Slane. He was an expert in the field.

I think most New Zealanders want society to be free of that sort of tracking device. People are worried that, in this modern age, there are systems whereby little devices can be put on someone’s person and from some distance away the person and his or her movements can be monitored. I think New Zealanders want tracking devices to be used only in particular cases—for example, serious drug crimes and such things that require the police to use an array of investigative weapons.

Hon PHIL GOFF (Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade) : I shall answer a couple of points made by members, and will start with a concern raised by Keith Locke. He said this legislation empowers the police to require assistance from a person, where necessary—such as providing the password to access a computer. I put it to Mr Locke that this provision no more infringes upon a person’s rights—for example, the right to silence, or the right not to self-incriminate—than it does to require a person, when the police appear with a search warrant, to actually open the door. This provision is not a dangerous breach of rights. It simply applies the law to meet the needs of modern technology

A recent case, about 3 years ago, involved the police physically picking up the computer of a lawyer and taking the entire machine, etc., out of the office block. It would be much more satisfactory if the police, when exercising a search warrant under the law, to access a property to look for a particular product, can access the material on the computer. It is warranted; it is protected.

Mr Locke also raised a concern about tracking devices. I am not sure why he is so concerned about this legislation, because at the moment it is not unlawful to put a tracking device on a vehicle; not at all. It is unlawful, if the police have to enter on to premises or if they have to break, or open, or interfere with something to do that. That constitutes trespass. If anything, this change in law places limits and clear safeguards on the police’s exercise of their authority. So this is hardly a matter of great moment for civil liberties, either. In fact, it goes some way towards protecting civil liberties in a reasonable way.

With regard to Mr Franks’ proposed amendment, I am sure he is sincere in what he is trying to achieve. I have consulted on his amendment. I have talked to parliamentary counsel and I have talked to the Ministry of Justice. Neither the Police nor theCustoms Service raised any of the concerns that the member has. I am advised that this legislation would not require any special act on the part of the police with regard to surveillance cameras. The cameras are not covert. They are there; they are open. Everybody knows they are there. The police do not have to enter on to premises that do not belong to them. They do not have to break and enter to put them up. I am told there is not a problem; that the definition is deliberately kept reasonably broad to take into account technological changes in the future, and that this is modelled on international law—specifically, Canadian law. No concern has been expressed by any of the parties that have some expertise in the matter that the implications of the legislation, as it is worded, and as tracking devices are defined, would be problematic for the Police or the Customs Service.

The CHAIRPERSON (Ann Hartley): I call Jill Pettis.

STEPHEN FRANKS (ACT) : I am concerned the Minister has simply relied—

The CHAIRPERSON (Ann Hartley): I am sorry—

Jill Pettis: Let him go.

The CHAIRPERSON (Ann Hartley): I apologise.

Jill Pettis: He’s like a child.

Dr Wayne Mapp: I raise a point of order, Madam Chairperson. I believe that the comment made by the junior Government whip in relation to a colleague was unparliamentary, and she should be asked to withdraw and apologise.

Jill Pettis: I never thought that being a mother was objectionable but if it offends the member, I withdraw and apologise.

STEPHEN FRANKS: The Hon Phil Goff does the Committee the courtesy of explaining or responding to points raised in this debate, and I appreciate that. However, I am concerned that he has misled himself, or has allowed himself to rely on the officials, who are simply saying that because surveillance cameras generally are not covert, then there is not a problem with the definition of “tracking device”.

There is nothing in this legislation that states that this applies only to covert devices. If this tracking device definition stated “covert”, then that might have been a relevant point. But it seems to apply to all tracking devices, whether covert or overt. Indeed, as I said, in its terms it probably applies to officers who put a sticker on their suitcase, so they can follow it on the baggage carousel. The select committee took the view that only the Police and the Customs Service seem to use tracking devices, and the committee urged the Government to look at legislation to cover private use of tracking devices. Officials appear to have justified this weird definition solely on the grounds that it is done in Canada. This is hardly an encouragement to New Zealanders, who look at the hoops that Canadians are now being put through by their weird Supreme Court. This is not a comfort to those who believe that people should be empowered to decide what they do with their own property and assets, and how they track their own property.

To be sure, it is helpful to stop the police and others from inserting tracking devices that are not wanted. It is quite appropriate that the bill states what it does to govern the use of covert devices by the authorities. But it does not deal with the implication that there now is that if the police, for example, want to put one of their tracking devices—at the request of the owner of a vehicle or a shop—in that shop or vehicle, then the police have to get a warrant. The police should not be under that burden. It is quite clear there is no exception in the legislation. There is nothing that states that the provision applies only where the tracking device is inserted where someone does not know, or where someone does not approve.

It is a shame the Minister is signalling that he is going to vote against an amendment that would have saved him from this difficulty. As I said to the Minister, when someone has gone through $50,000 worth of cost in trying to get the court to say what the officials say is common sense, I hope the Minister will have the grace to feel embarrassed.

DAVID BENSON-POPE (Senior Whip—Labour) : I move, That the question be now put.

• Motion agreed to.
• The question was put that the amendments set out on Supplementary Order Paper 164 in the name of the Hon Phil Goff to Part 3 be agreed to.
• Amendments agreed to.

The CHAIRPERSON (Ann Hartley): The amendment in the name of Keith Locke to clause 26 is out of order because it is inconsistent with a previous decision of the Committee.

• The question was put that the following amendment in the name of Keith Locke to clause 33 be agreed to:

to omit this clause.

KEITH LOCKE (Green) : I rise to support the schedules. There are two schedules here. One relates to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which is a UN convention, and the other relates to the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection. As has been said before in speeches I have made in the first and second readings and in the Committee stage, the Green Party strongly supports New Zealand adhering to these two important conventions. It is important in relation to nuclear materials, not only as part of the damage to the nuclear environment but also to the peace and welfare of the world, that we do not allow the circulation of nuclear materials, as prohibited by these conventions, and this is quite relevant to some of the political events of today.

I was reading in the news media—just last week, I think—about Israel’s development of nuclear materials in the form of nuclear bombs. Of course, these conventions go more to the raw nuclear materials. But the nuclear materials being used by Israel to make bombs are now being put on submarines, so Israel now has nuclear weapons on submarines. Israel has been assisted by the United States, according to the informed sources that various newspapers in New Zealand and around the world quoted. The United States Government was complicit in getting those nuclear bombs on Israeli submarines, in contradiction of its declared opposition to some other countries having nuclear materials and being able to develop them into nuclear weapons.

There was a lot of attention paid to Iraq. The United States claimed that Iraq was building a nuclear capacity. The inspectors had told the people well before they went there that there was not a nuclear weapons programme under way in Iraq. It had been finished in the early 1990s, through the efforts of the UN inspectors there.

Other attention is being paid to Iran and North Korea, and I think rightly so. We do not want nuclear proliferation and we do not particularly want the presence of nuclear weapons in the Indian subcontinent. That is very dangerous, in terms of what might happen in a war between India and Pakistan, or in a major military conflict, if one side or another resorts to nuclear weapons. It made me very worried when the President of Pakistan said, about a year ago, when it had a military standoff, that the only reason India did not invade in a conventional sense was that Pakistan had nuclear weapons.

We have a really serious problem here. Anything we can do in terms of reducing the existence of these sorts of nuclear materials and their circulation, and their possible development into nuclear bombs, the better. The same applies to plastic explosives. New Zealand is playing a lead role in the area of nuclear disarmament. We should look at it as both a problem with nuclear weapons and a health problem, in relation to nuclear materials themselves. It has come out over the last day. The Hon Bill English made a statement, that everyone read as the National Party moderating its nuclear policy or trying to undermine New Zealand’s policy of stopping the visit of nuclear-powered warships to this country—that he was not recognising that there is a danger in nuclear materials, in the form of nuclear propulsion.

While there are a lot of safety procedures in many of these nuclear power plants, and with nuclear generators on warships, the fact is that there still is a risk if something happens. A British warship has gone aground in the Tasman Sea recently. Ships can have accidents, and if those accidents involve nuclear materials on nuclear waste ships, or nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed warships, it can be very damaging to the environment. We should definitely avoid that sort of thing.

RON MARK (NZ First) : I was not going to take a call on the schedules, but I will do two things. First, I will compliment Mr Locke, because Mr Locke brings to this Chamber the alternative view that people fought and died to allow to exist. I will compliment Mr Locke because he is absolutely consistent. It does not matter what bill comes before the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, if it is a bill that in any way impacts on human rights or civil liberties, Mr Locke is true to form, and regardless of what sort of derision might be heaped upon him and his political party, he will fight for those things he truly believes in. I give him full credit for that.

However, I am confused when the Green Party votes against Part 2, and then says it supports the schedules. The fact is that the schedules are meaningless without Part 2. Once again, we have one of those situations where members of the Green Party stand up and say that they oppose the lifting of the moratorium on genetic engineering, yet when presented with a golden opportunity to force the Government’s hand and stop it allowing the moratorium to be lifted, they fade into the distance. They give up their vote for the abolition of the right to appeal to the Privy Council and roll over and play dead.

Here again they had the opportunity to enshrine their beliefs within this legislation to endorse the nuclear material and plastic explosives conventions, and what did they do? They voted against Part 2. To now stand up and say that they agree with the schedules and endorse everything they stand for—waxing lyrical about the evils of nuclear-power plants and nuclear-powered vessels, and how supportive they are of New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy—means absolutely nothing. Is it any wonder that discerning New Zealanders are thoroughly confused by the positions Green members take? I would have fully understood had they opposed Part 1 and voted for Part 2, or said that they were opposed to the overall thrust of this legislation and voted against the entire bill. But to vote against Part 1 and Part 2—which enshrines the schedules—then say that they support the schedules does not make one ounce of sense.

Dr Wayne Mapp: How does one implement schedules?

RON MARK: Precisely! How does the Government implement the schedules and give effect to those two conventions if it does not have Part 2? I ask Mr Locke to take another call to clarify that for the record, because when we get on the hustings and talk about nuclear policy, nuclear-free New Zealand, and the evils of nuclear-power plants in Australia, Britain, or wherever, Mr Locke’s comments here will be raised to the fore and held against him. I do not think that is fair. He is clearly a very misunderstood person, but the explanations he has given tend to lead us to that conclusion.

New Zealand First will be consistent. We will vote for the schedules and for the entire bill. We acknowledge and respect Mr Locke’s commitment to civil liberties and the issues he has raised, but this latest speech of his has certainly raised a great deal of confusion.

STEPHEN FRANKS (ACT) : I am hopeful that we can get a bit of clarification about what happens if the status of these conventions is changed, and whether a change automatically carries through into the relevant definitions in the Terrorism Suppression Act. The conventions that define terrorism and terrorist acts for the purpose of the bill appear in the Terrorism Suppression Act to come through in their form from time to time. I may have missed something when I was flicking through that Act, trying to work out the interrelationship between the Act and this bill. The effect of the Terrorism Suppression Act is that the Prime Minister can simply adopt the definitions from these international instruments, and is then able to designate and use them in a way that is outside the reach of this Parliament. I am anxious to hear that the definitions in these conventions—having been put in a schedule and, therefore, presumably, carefully considered by the select committee—cannot be changed by the parties to the instruments without the approval of this House, so as to have an effect on the way they are incorporated in Part 2.

It is a relatively straightforward question, and I suspect that there is a very simple answer to it. The definitions are either applied in their form from time to time, irrespective of New Zealand’s adherence to any change, or they are not. Maybe the answer is that they cannot be changed, and that there is a single-party veto on change affecting us. Whichever way it goes, I would be glad to hear that, having solemnly considered these definitions in a bill schedule, a change made by the other parties cannot then bind the New Zealand people and their Parliament.

DAVID BENSON-POPE (Senior Whip—Labour) : I move, That the question be now put.

KEITH LOCKE (Green) : I want to very briefly reply to Ron Mark, but I thought I explained it before. This problem often confronts MPs, and I am sure that Mr Mark has confronted it before. It is that a bill has a part that has some very good stuff in it and some very bad stuff in it, and members can have an argument voting for or against. In this case, I thought that the powers of customs to seize materials from people who were not yet designated terrorists was a bad part of Part 2, so on behalf of the Green Party I voted against that. However, all along we said that we supported the good parts. That is one of the positive things about the passage of this bill—it has some good material in it, even if there is a lot of bad material, and we support the good material that has come through the process. It is very simple.

• Schedules agreed to.
• The Committee divided the bill into the Crimes Amendment Bill, the Terrorism Suppression Amendment Bill, the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Bill (No 2), the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill, the Sentencing Amendment Bill, and the Summary Proceedings Amendment Bill, pursuant to Supplementary Order Paper 163, divided into the <Bill Titles>
• Bill reported with amendment.